INTRODUCTION
The correlation between family structure and economic wellbeing is well established. Poverty rates vary dramatically by family structure; in 2006 about 8 percent of married couples with children, 40 percent of single mother families, and 14 percent of single father families were poor.
1 Eligibility for income support programs, including cash welfare, food stamps, and the Earned Income Tax Credit, are tied to family composition. Moreover, in recent years policymakers have sought not only to respond to family changes, but to try to influence the decisions people make about marriage, divorce, and childbearing. Poverty policies and family policies are increasingly tied.
If the apparent strength of the link between poverty and family structure seems obvious, its nature is less clear. For example, having a child before getting married is associated with an increased likelihood of poverty. However, living in poverty also increases the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. 2 Thus, neither nonmarital childbearing nor poverty on its own can account for the high rates of poverty among single mother families. In addition, decisions about work, marriage, and childbearing are increasingly disconnected (Schoen, Landale, and Daniels, 2007; Edin and Kefalas, 2005; Ellwood and Jencks, 2004; Spain and Bianchi, 1996) . Women are now more likely to work, regardless of marital or parental status, and children are increasingly likely to spend time in families that do not include both biological parents, and which may include half siblings or step-siblings. There is greater variety in family forms and the members of any given family are increasingly likely to experience changes in household structure over time (Bumpass and Lu, 2000; Manning, Smock, and Majumdar, 2004) .
In addition to its relationship to economic wellbeing, family structure is of interest because children who do not live with both biological parents may be more vulnerable to other risks, even after taking economic factors into account (Amato, 2005; McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994) . Recent discussions have emphasized the potential importance of fathers, who are less likely to be part of their children's lives when parents are divorced were never married (Hofferth, 2006; Tamis-LeMonda, et. Al., 2002) .
Moreover, poverty creates challenges that may be difficult to manage with only one available parent (Oliker, 1995; Edin and Lein, 1997) , especially as more single mothers work outside the home (Waldfogel, this volume). Thus, changes in family structure not only place more individuals at greater risk of poverty, but also may increase their vulnerability to challenges associated with poverty.
Poverty reflects insufficient resources relative to needs. Income poverty in the U.S. is measured by comparing cash income (for low income families, largely earnings and cash benefits), to a needs standard (which adjusts for the number of individuals in the household). For example, a single woman (or man) in 2008 will be considered poor if her income is below $10,400. If she has two children, becoming a single mother and part of a family of three, she will be considered poor if her family income is below $17,600. Thus, even putting aside the demands of motherhood and the potential reduction in hours worked and earnings, the increased financial needs of a larger family will increase the chance of poverty.
If she marries, becoming a married couple family of four, the needs standard rises to $21,200. However, with a second adult in the household there is likely to a second earner-potentially reducing poverty. The potential poverty reduction associated with a second adult also reflects the relatively modest increase in the needs standard with each person added to the household. Economies of scale mean that each additional person adds less than proportional needs (see Meyer and Wallace, this volume) .
We use this simple model of income and needs to help structure the discussion that follows. The implications for poverty of changes in marriage, childbearing, and work depend on how these changes are related, and the net effects on income, and on needs. As we will show, the decline in marriage has increased poverty, all else equal. But, all else has not remained equal; while women are less likely to be married, they are also more likely to be working. Because these two changes are related, measuring the effect of changes in marriage on poverty is complex.
This chapter examines changes since 1970 in family structure and their implications for poverty and income support policy. We discuss changes in marriage and childbearing and their implications for the living situations of children, such as the increasing proportion of children living with a single mother.
We also highlight differences in work and earnings by marital and parental status, such as the substantial increase in the employment rates of single mothers with young children. Notwithstanding the growing interest in men and fathers, much of our analysis focuses on women's marriage rates, fertility, living arrangements, and employment. This focus follows from the concern for children, and reflects the persistent presumption that women have the primary responsibility for both fertility decisions and child wellbeing, as well as the reality that most children live with their mother (and less often with their father).
TRENDS IN FAMILY STRUCTURE SINCE 1970
Changing patterns of poverty, prospects for the future and the potential of alternative policy interventions all depend on the interrelationships among poverty and marriage, childbearing, family living arrangements, and employment status. We highlight changes over time and across racial and ethnic groups. We analyze demographic trends for all families-not just for families at greatest risk for poverty.
However, the trends are qualitatively similar if, for example, we restrict our analysis to less-educated women.
3 3 We evaluated trends for women with "low education" defined as less than a high school diploma in 1970 and no more than a high school diploma in 2006. In both years, about 40 percent of all women age 18-64 were in these categories. This definition uses a changing cutoff point but includes the equivalent part of the distribution in both years, in contrast to one that uses a constant education level (e.g. less than high school) but reflects a relatively more disadvantaged group as the educational distribution improves over time. These calculations are available from the authors.
Marriage, Divorce, and Cohabitation
Households that include two adults generally have greater opportunities to avoid poverty-since the second adult on average adds more to potential income (though earnings) than to needs (given economies of scale). Thus, declines in marriage and increases in divorce are both poverty increasing.
Cohabitating couples may capture the same benefits, though the implications of cohabitation for official poverty measures, as well as for actual economic wellbeing, are complex and are discussed further below.
Family composition changes reflect changes in the proportion of individuals who marry, the stability of marriages, and for those who divorce, the probability of remarriage. Cohabitation as a prelude to, or substitute for, marriage has also increased (Bumpass and Lu, 2000; Raley, 2001) . by age 25 to 29, and even by age 40 to 44 only 64 percent were married. The steepest declines in agespecific marriage percentages occurred between 1970 and 1980, and between 1980 and 1990 , with more modest declines after 1990. 5 A similar decline and delay in marriage is apparent for men (data not shown). But, because men on average marry at older ages, the proportion married compared to women is lower at 25 to 29, similar by 35 to 39, and slightly higher at 40 to 44.
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The declining proportion of individuals who are currently married reflects growth in the proportion of women and men who never marry and changes in divorce, remarriage, and cohabitation. In 1970, 95 percent of women had ever been married by age 40 to 44, a figure that declined to 85 percent in
2006.
The proportion married at a point in time fell more dramatically because of increased divorce rates. 4 Unless otherwise noted, all statistics come from authors' calculations from the decennial census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and the American Community Survey (2006). Sources: Authors' calculations from the decennial Census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and the American Community Survey (2006).
In 1970, about 6 percent of women in their early 40s were divorced; this doubled to 12 percent by 1980
and rose to16 percent in 2006.
The trends in marital status for all individuals obscure variation across racial and ethnic groups. (Bumpass et al., 1991; Raley, 2000) . 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) 
Childbearing
Changes in marriage patterns interact with changes in childbearing and affect both poverty and the composition of the poor. Declining marriage and increasing divorce reduce the number of adults available to provide income to a household, increasing poverty. To the extent that declines in marriage coincide with women having fewer children, reductions in the size of families reduce the resource needed to avoid poverty. Figure 3 shows that the average number of children present in the household has declined over time, falling especially in the 1970s and 1980s. 8 In 1970, women age 35 to 39 had an average of about 2.4 children; by 1990 they had an average of only about 1.3 children. All other things equal, women are more likely to be poor the more children they have, both because larger families need more income to avoid poverty, and because greater parenting responsibilities restrict women's work hours in the paid labor market. Thus, the declining numbers of children per woman can be expected to reduce poverty, all else equal.
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While overall fertility declines tend to reduce poverty, growth in the proportion of children born outside of marriage has had the opposite effect. In 1960, 5 percent of all births were to unmarried mothers. As shown by the dark line in Figure 4 , by 2004 the share had risen to 36 percent. Many authors have focused on the social, economic, and policy changes responsible for these trends, and their Sources: Authors' calculations from the decennial Census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and the American Community Survey (2006). 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 Understanding the origins of the growing proportion of children born outside of marriage is important in evaluating potential causes and policy responses. Although empirical evidence for a causal connection is mixed (Moffitt, 1998a; 2003) , there are some theoretical reasons to expect that increased welfare benefits might increase nonmarital births. However, to the extent that the increased proportion of births to unmarried women is due to changes in marital fertility, as was the case through the mid-1970s, a causal role for welfare policy becomes questionable. There is also little evidence that the major 1996 welfare reforms had a substantial effect on marriage and childbearing Karoly, 2005, 2007) .
The increased proportion of births to single mothers increases children's vulnerability to poverty as more children (and mothers) live in households that include only one potential earner. On the other hand, declines in the number of children per family have tended to reduce poverty. In other words, contemporary women are less likely to have a husband to contribute economic support, but they are also less likely to need to support large families.
Family Living Arrangements
The implications of changes in marriage and fertility for children's living arrangements and poverty rates can be complex, especially when we consider the presence of unmarried partners or other adults. Sources: Authors' calculations from the decennial Census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and the American Community Survey (2006). or adopted parents. 13 The 14 Race and ethnicity is determined by the race and ethnicity of the female head, if present, and otherwise by the male head. 15 The data only distinguish mothers who are household heads or related to their household head. Note that we cannot distinguish the relationship between children of the household head and adults unrelated to the head. Thus, some "cohabiting male partners" may be the fathers of children in the household, and some of the children living with their unmarried mother may also be living with their (unmarried) father. The parallel situation exists in the case of single father households and unmarried female partners. Sources: Authors' calculations from the decennial Census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) The increase in single parents who live with an unmarried partner or related adult has consequences for the economic and social resources available to these parents and their children. In determining poverty status, official poverty statistics include the income of related adults as part of total family income, and include them as family members supported by that income. In contrast, the income and needs of "unrelated" cohabitants are not considered. If an unrelated cohabitant is a part of the same economic unit, household income needs are greater (given larger household size) and household resources may be greater (if the cohabiting adult has income).
The technical issues related to household membership and poverty measures reflect important substantive challenges in defining economic units and assessing their resources and needs. Ideally, additional adults, for example, grandparents, will increase the financial and social resources available to vulnerable families. A grandparent or other adult may also provide formal or informal childcare and other supports. On the other hand, additional adults may increase family stress and the responsibilities of a single parent. For example, an elderly grandparent may require care, or the potential for physical or emotional abuse from an additional adult may increase the need for the single mother to supervise her children. 16 Even the assumption that parents and their biological children share resources to maximize some measure of family wellbeing is a simplification (Bergstrom, 1997) .
Employment
While changes in labor market opportunities are discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Blank, this volume), we examine women's increased employment, declines in male employment, and the relationship with changes in family structure. All else equal, families are less likely to be poor the greater the number of adults and the fewer the number of children. Households that include adult males are less likely to be poor than those that include only adult females, both because men work more hours on average, and because they earn more per hour on average. However, since 1970, women's labor force participation has increased, especially for women with children, and gender gaps in labor market outcomes have declined (Blau, 1998; . These changes affect the level and distribution of income among families headed by married couples as well as among families with single female heads (Blau, 1998; Cancian and Reed, 1999) . They also reflect changes in gender roles and contemporary expectations regarding the caretaking and employment responsibilities of mothers and fathers, which interact with the public policy context. An accounting of changes in family and poverty must account for the dramatic growth in women's labor force participation and the declining opportunities for men, especially those with less education (Toossi, 2002; Blau and Kahn, 2007; Moffitt, 2000) . (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) While women's employment rates increased in most periods for most groups, the patterns vary substantially by family structure. Figure 8 shows increases in the proportion working at some point in the previous year among women ages 18 to 64 by marital status and the presence of preschool (under age 6) or school-age (6-17 years) children. In the 1970s and 1980s the increase was more pronounced for Sources: Authors' calculations from the decennial Census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and the American Community Survey (2006).
As shown in Figure 7 , there is less change over time in employment patterns for men, though there have been modest declines over time in male employment rates-in contrast to the increases apparent among women. When we disaggregate male employment patterns by family structure we find that in all years married men and resident fathers are more likely to work, but there is little evidence of systematic difference in the time trend by marital or parental status (figure not shown).
Although it remains an important cultural reference point, the "traditional" family, including an employed father, a homemaker mother and children, is increasingly uncommon. In 2006, only 12 percent of all families fit this model, down from 36 percent in 1970. 19 In part, this decline reflects a growing disconnect between marriage and childbearing and childrearing. At the same time that single mother families are more prevalent, increases in women's own earnings mean they are less vulnerable to economic hardship. We consider explanations for these countervailing changes in the next section, and then turn to an assessment of their importance in explaining changes in the level of poverty over time.
EXPLAINING CHANGES IN MARRIAGE, CHILDBEARING, AND EMPLOYMENT
We have documented substantial declines in marriage, a reduction in the average number of children per family, and a dramatic increase in the proportion of children born outside marriage since 1970. Over the same period, women's employment has increased, especially for mothers. In contrast, men, especially those with less education, have experienced stagnant or declining rates of employment.
These changes in family structure and employment are interrelated. For example, delays in marriage may reduce fertility, thereby reducing demands for work within the home, and facilitating women's market work. On the other hand, as labor market opportunities for women improve-in absolute terms, or relative to men's-women face higher opportunity costs of leaving employment to have (additional) children, as well as reduced economic incentives to marriage. Decisions to have children outside of marriage may reflect women's increasing ability to support a family independently, or the short supply of men with family-supporting earnings.
Understanding the factors that underlie changes in family formation, and how these have been affected by economic and policy changes, is complicated by the interdependence of economic, social, and demographic changes. While few factors can accurately be viewed as independent, an assessment of the causes of family structure and employment changes can inform policy discussions. First, to the extent that social policy attempts to alter certain behaviors-for example, to encourage employment-understanding the factors underlying current behavior is an important starting point. Second, concerns that current The decline in the proportion married results from people marrying at older ages, or not at all. It also reflects higher rates of divorce, only somewhat offset by increases in remarriage. What accounts for these trends? The standard economic model of marriage emphasizes gains from a specialized division of labor in a context where one spouse (generally the husband) commands a substantially higher wage (Becker, 1991) . In this case, marriage creates a context in which the lower-wage spouse can devote herself to home production-raising children, preparing meals, and maintaining the home-leaving the higher-wage spouse to specialize in earning wages. As men's advantage in the labor market relative to women has declined Bowler, 1999) , so have the potential gains from marital specialization, reducing women's incentive to marry.
In addition, over the same period, increased marital instability increased the risks to women of interrupting their wage employment. As divorce becomes more common, the probability that a woman will have to be the primary provider for herself and her children has increased. At the same time, as labor force participation has increased, so has the feasibility of leaving an undesirable marriage. Thus, women's increasing economic independence may be both a cause and a consequence of greater marital instability.
The past three decades have seen increased inequality in the distribution of wages for men, and stagnant or declining wages, especially for younger men with low education (Blank, in this volume).
Thus, men's labor market advantage, and the consequent potential gains from marriage, have been particularly eroded for low-income individuals. Wilson (1987) argued that industrial restructuring and changes in the organization and location of jobs substantially reduced men's employment and earnings prospects, especially for urban black men with low education. High rates of incarceration also limit the pool of "marriageable" men with access to family-supporting employment especially for African
Americans (Blau et. al, 2000; Lopoo and Western, 2005; Holzer, 2007) .
Together with women's increased economic prospects and the availability of birth control, changes in social norms have made it easier to have sexual relationships and cohabit outside of marriage, to establish households independent of parents or spouses, and to rear children outside of marriage. Thus, as the economic advantage of marriage declined, so has the importance of marriage as a precursor to parenthood (Edin and Kefalas, 2005) . The independent causal role of social norms is difficult to disentangle. In any case, economically stable marriage remains the normative goal, even among demographic groups with low rates of marriage (Gibson-Davis et al., 2004) . Nonetheless, cohabitation, nonmarital childbearing, and divorce are increasingly accepted (Thornton and Young-DeMarco, 2001 ).
Changes in contraceptive technology and reduced fertility also contribute to women's increased labor force participation. Of course, it is difficult to distinguish cause and effect; mothers may be more likely to work in the market because they have fewer children, or they may be having fewer children because of the demands of greater labor force participation.
Another focus of public debate and research has been the role policy has played in facilitating changes in marriage, childbearing, and employment among low-income women. With regards to marriage policy, there are concerns about the disincentives to marriage embedded in the welfare system, as well as the vulnerability of the low-income population to policies aimed at altering family behaviors. Critics of welfare argued that the availability of financial support, and the structure of eligibility rules that targeted single parent families, discouraged marriage and parental responsibility (Murray, 1984) . The generosity of welfare cannot fully explain changes in marriage because AFDC benefits declined substantially after the mid-1970s over the same period that marriage rates declined. And, the decline in marriage was evident among higher-income individuals who never received welfare. Estimates of the magnitude of any negative impact of welfare on marriage vary quite substantially, but generally suggest at most modest effects (Moffitt, 1998b; 2003 ; on recent welfare reforms Karoly, 2005, 2007) . Some research suggests that income supports may increase marriage rates, possibly by helping low-income couples achieve the financial stability seen by some as a prerequisite for marriage (Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa, 2006; Gibson-Davis, et al., 2004) .
The potential role of child support enforcement on marriage is another area of debate. Policy changes over the past 30 years have substantially increased the proportion of nonmarital births for which paternity is established, and have contributed to more fathers of children born to unmarried parents being ordered to pay child support, and making payments (Cancian and Meyer, 2006) . Although child support enforcement and paternity establishment is primarily aimed at increasing the formal economic support provided by nonresident fathers, improved enforcement may also change incentives to marry and have children. The increasing probability of paying and receiving child support might be expected to have offsetting effects on the financial incentives to have children outside of marriage-increasing the costs of nonmarital births for nonresident fathers, and decreasing them for resident mothers. For some single men who might otherwise provide few resources to their children, increased child support enforcement may raise the expected costs of fatherhood. In contrast, despite receiving child support or cash welfare, single mothers typically bear most of the responsibility and costs associated with raising children. Changes in welfare benefit levels (or child support payments 20 ) may thus have a relatively minor impact on the benefits and costs faced by a single women considering motherhood. Research suggests that increased child support enforcement is associated with reductions in nonmarital births (Garfinkel et al., 2003; Plotnick et al., 2004; Plotnick et al. 2006 ).
Because many nonmarital births are to cohabiting or romantically involved parents, child support enforcement may negatively affect these "fragile families". While child support provides financial resources, requirements to establish paternity and a formal child support order, and efforts to enforce that order, may increase conflict between parents. Noncompliant fathers face enforcement actions that may reduce their willingness and ability to support their children (Waller and Plotnick, 2001; Waller, 2002; Pate and Johnson, 2000; Garfinkel and McLanahan, 2000) .
Over the last three decades, several policy changes have sought to encourage employment and "make work pay" for low-income parents, including an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit, expansions of Medicaid and the State Child Health Insurance Program. The EITC provides a substantial earnings subsidy for low-income earners with children (Moffitt and Scholz, this volume; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001) , and the expanded availability of public health insurance for low-income children supports the move from welfare to work (Swartz, this volume). Childcare policies, particularly recently expanded subsidies for some low-income families, also facilitate employment (Waldfogel, this volume).
THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT ON POVERTY
How have the changes in family structure and employment, reviewed above, affected poverty rates? We decompose changes in poverty over the period 1969 to 2006. We find that, on their own, changes in family structure would have led to a substantial increase in poverty. However, the growth of female employment had important poverty-reducing effects.
support while maintaining their full welfare eligibility. These provisions take effect in 2008. However, as of this writing, most states retain 100 percent of child support paid on behalf of children of cash welfare recipients. percent. However, the poverty rate within five family types declined (column 5); the only exception was single males with children, who accounted for only 4 percent of persons in 2006. An important factor in the growth of the overall poverty rate was the shift in population shares by family type. As we have shown in Section 2, marriage and child-rearing rates declined over this period and the share of children raised in single-parent families increased. As a result of these changes, the share of persons living in married couple families fell by 21 percent whereas the share of people in families without children grew by 13 percent and the share in single-parent families grew by 8 percent (column 6). With the exception of married couples without children, all of the growing family types have higher poverty rates than do married couples with children. In other words, the population shifted from a relatively low poverty group (married couples with children) to family types with higher risks of poverty.
One approach to the question, "By how much would overall poverty have increased if there had been a change in family structure but no change in poverty rates for each type of family?" is to construct a 21 Poverty rates differ from the official Census Bureau statistics because we use the census and American Community Survey rather than the Current Population Survey and because we limit the analysis to families with head(s) in the age range 18 to 64. We standardize the poverty thresholds over time by using the 2006 thresholds. For consistency with official poverty thresholds, we adjust income to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U before 1983 and the CPI-U-X1 in 1983 and later. As in the official poverty calculation, all related persons living in the same household are grouped as a single family. Families are classified into types based on the marital status of the family head(s). For example, a single woman heading a household that includes her married daughter, son-in-law, and grandchild is classified as "Single female, with children." Table 2 ). The actual increase in poverty was much lower because poverty rates for each family type declined, in part due to increases in women's work and the reduction in the number of children per family (as shown in Section 2).
The shift-share analysis provides a simple way of gauging the possible magnitude of the impact of family structure changes. However, this approach may overestimate the impact of family structure changes by implicitly assuming that poverty rates would remain the same within each family type. For example, the decline in poverty among single women may result from a change in family structure if the decline in marriage was disproportionately among high-education, high-resource women. 22 To address this concern, we use a model-based counterfactual to examine the expected impact on poverty due to changes in family structure controlling for education and age. The model-based approach will underestimate poverty because it assumes that after accounting for education, age, and race/ethnicity, there is no relationship between family structure and personal characteristics such a skill, experience, and determination. 23 Using this approach, we find that changes in family structure increased poverty but the impact is much smaller than estimated with the shift-share approach: 1.0 percent as compared to 3.1 22 Conversely, it is possible that the shift-share approach underestimates the impact of family structure if the decline in marriage was disproportionately among women with low education. 23 We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the probability of being in each of 8 mutually exclusive family types (single or married interacted with zero, one, two or more than two children) as a function of low education, age, and race/ethnicity. Poverty rates within family type are modeled as a function of low education, age, and work hours. The model-based approach underestimates poverty because it implicitly assumes that there is no correlation of unobserved characteristics in the two models. Details are available from the authors. (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and American Community Survey (2006). Note: Data include families with head(s) ages 18 to 64. "Total" is the sum of the three preceding columns. Reported number may not add to the total due to rounding.
percent (Tables 2 and 3 ). Given the biases of the two approaches, it is likely that the true impact lies between these two estimates.
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Over this same period, there was substantial growth in female employment. Using these two methods, we find that growth in women's hours of work reduced poverty by between 2.2 percent and 4.6 percent. By comparison, there was relatively little change in male employment and thus a limited effect on poverty (between 0.3 percent and 0.9 percent). Across demographic groups by race/ethnicity we see a similar pattern: Changes in family structure put upward pressure on poverty but this was mitigated by growth in female employment. Poverty among blacks fell substantially, in large part due to growth in female employment. Finally, among children, the change in family structure had a more substantial impact, although it too was mitigated by growth in female employment.
These counterfactual calculations, however, do not measure the causal effects of changes in family behaviors on poverty because the analysis ignores the relationship between family behaviors and poverty rates. The shift-share calculations rely on the unrealistic assumption that family structure and behaviors could change to 2006 levels while poverty rates within each type of family could remain at 1969 levels-i.e., the "all else equal" assumption. The model-based calculations rely on the assumption that relationships between family structure, employment, and poverty can be modeled solely with education, age, and race/ethnicity. 25 In practice, as discussed above, decisions about family structure and labor force participation are interconnected and many unobservable characteristics influence these behaviors. (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) and American Community Survey (2006). Note: Data include families with head(s) ages 18 to 64. "Total" is the sum of the three preceding columns. Reported number may not add to the total due to rounding.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the declining proportion of children living in married-couple families between 1970 and 2006 reflects many interrelated factors. Fewer people are marrying, and those who are married are on average older and are more likely to divorce. The smaller number of married couples are having fewer children, while the birth rates for the growing number of unmarried women have increased.
Together these trends result in a greater proportion of families headed by single mothers-both because a higher proportion of births take place outside of marriage and because of growth in the proportion of children born within marriage whose parents divorce.
Single mother families, generally relying on the earnings of only one adult, are more than five times as likely to be poor as married couple families. On its own, the change in family structure has been poverty-increasing. However, a number of factors have had countervailing impacts. First, the increase in single female households has coincided with a major increase in the employment of women. While fewer women and children currently can depend on regular support from a husband or resident father, more women, especially mothers, are working and many are earning enough to raise their families out of poverty. Employment rates for single mothers with young children-a particularly vulnerable groupgrew substantially in the 1990s. In addition, women are having fewer children, reducing the total family income needed to avoid poverty.
As discussed above, increased cohabitation may substantially explain the delay in entry into marriage. Moreover, almost half of recent births to unmarried women are to cohabiting parents. Treating cohabiting adults as partners and including their income as a family resource substantially reduces the increase in poverty due to changes in family structure.
Thus, changes in employment, the number of children, and cohabitation have reduced the growth in poverty otherwise associated with the declining proportion of married couple families. However, while increased employment has made women and single mothers less economically vulnerable, it has presumably come at the cost of (unpaid) time spent supporting their family and community (Waring, 1999; Sandberg and Hofferth, 2001 ). In addition, the standard measure of income poverty used here neglects the nondiscretionary personal costs of employment, such as transportation and childcare, and thus overstates the poverty-reducing effects of employment (Iceland, 2000) . Similarly, while many unmarried mothers may live with the fathers of their children or other men, cohabiting relationships provide less economic security than marriage, in part due to their relative instability (Bumpass and Lu, 2000; Manning, et al., 2004; Kenney, 2004; DeLeire and Kalil, 2005) .
There are several types of public policy responses to the increased diversity and instability of family forms. Some policies explicitly aim to change family structure, for example, to promote marriage or reduce nonmarital births. While it is too early to know whether recent efforts to promote healthy marriage will be successful (Dion, 2005; Dion et al., 2008) , some have argued that even small changes in marriage patterns could produce substantial returns on fairly modest investments (Amato, 2005; Amato and Maynard, 2007) . Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that current policy options will dramatically alter the marriage and fertility patterns of the last four decades, most of which generally apply across income groups within the United States as well as in other countries. While some policies to encourage marriage and, especially, reduce unplanned and teen pregnancy, may prove effective, declines in marriage and increases in nonmarital childbearing are unlikely to be reversed by feasible public policies. Other policies aim to respond to changes in family forms, for example, to reduce the negative consequences of nonmarital births and divorce through policies such as child support, or to encourage or facilitate employment, especially among single mothers. These policies, discussed in Jane Waldfogel's chapter in this volume, will be critical in determining the consequences of family change for the wellbeing.
As we have documented, the past 40 years have been a period of increasing diversity in family structures and changing relationships between marriage, fertility, and employment. Children are more likely to spend some time living outside a married couple family. Regardless of whether their mother is married or single, children, especially younger children, are also more likely to live with a mother who is working in the paid labor market. To reduce the economic vulnerability of children and families, public policy must respond to the diversity and instability of family forms. Even if effective policy interventions reducing divorce and nonmarital childbearing are developed, many children will live with only one parent, and many parents will face challenges in meeting the economic and social needs of their families.
Recognizing these challenges, public policy must respond in ways that support the increasing complexity of family arrangements, and the growing proportion of workers who also have primary responsibility for parenting their children.
